Proving information-theoretic security in the quantum random oracle model
Staff - Faculty of Informatics
Date: / -
USI Lugano Campus, room SI-013, Informatics building (Via G. Buffi 13)
Nick Spooner, UC Berkeley, USA
In a recent work, we show that information-theoretic security of many useful protocols in the quantum random oracle model can be derived from a classical quantity called 'instability'. In this talk, Spooner will show how this quantity bounds soundness in the QROM, building on the compressed oracle formalism of Zhandry. He will then show how properties of instability enable us to argue security for complex protocols in a modular fashion; in particular, we are able to prove tight security for the Micali SNARK construction in the QROM. Based on joint work with Alessandro Chiesa and Peter Manohar.
Nick Spooner is a PhD student at UC Berkeley, advised by Alessandro Chiesa. He received his Master's degree from ETH Zürich in 2015. His work focuses on algebraic approaches to designing efficient zero knowledge proofs, and post quantum cryptography.
Host: Prof. Stefan Wolf