Fresh Re-Keying: Securing Multiple Parties against Side-Channel and Fault Attacks
Staff - Faculty of Informatics
Start date: 12 December 2011
End date: 13 December 2011
The Faculty of Informatics is pleased to announce a seminar given by Marcel Medwed
DATE: Monday, December 12th, 2011
PLACE: USI Università della Svizzera italiana, room A13, Red building (Via G. Buffi 13)
Security-aware embedded systems are widespread nowadays and many applications, such as payment, pay-TV and automotive applications rely on them. These devices are usually very resource constrained but at the same time likely to operate in a hostile environment. Thus, the implementation of low-cost protection mechanisms against physical attacks is vital for their market relevance. An appealing choice, to counteract a large family of physical attacks with one mechanism, seem to be protocol-level countermeasures. Fresh re-keying scheme combines the advantages of re-keying with those of classical countermeasures such as masking and hiding. The seminar will present the results of two papers on this topic and two case studies, a hardware and a software implementation.
Dr. Marcel Medwed is a postdoctoral researcher at the UCL (Université catholique de Louvain) crypto group. He received his Master of Science and PhD degree from Graz University of Technology. He has been a visiting researcher at the Crypto Group of Bristol University. His research interests are mainly focused on embedded systems security, covering in particular fault and side-channel attacks and countermeasure design and evaluation. At the moment his research mainly focuses on protocol level countermeasures and practical implementation of leakage resilient cryptography.
HOST: Prof. Mariagiovanna Sami and Dr. Francesco Regazzoni